Computer simulation for risk management: Hydrogen refueling stations and water supply of a large region by Markert, Frank & Kozine, Igor
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
General rights 
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners 
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. 
 
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. 
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain 
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal  
 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately 
and investigate your claim. 
   
 
Downloaded from orbit.dtu.dk on: Dec 20, 2017
Computer simulation for risk management: Hydrogen refueling stations and water
supply of a large region
Markert, Frank; Kozin, Igor
Published in:
PSAM11&amp;ESREL 2012 proceedings
Publication date:
2012
Link back to DTU Orbit
Citation (APA):
Markert, F., & Kozine, I. (2012). Computer simulation for risk management: Hydrogen refueling stations and
water supply of a large region. In PSAM11&ESREL 2012 proceedings Curran Associates.
Computer simulation for risk management: Hydrogen refueling stations and 
water supply of a large region 
 
Frank Markerta* and Igor Kozinea 
aTechnical University of Denmark, Kongens Lyngby, Denmark 
 
 
Abstract: Risk management of complex environments needs the supportive tools provided by computer 
models and simulation. During time, various tools have been developed and been applied with different 
degree of success. The still lasting increase in computer power and the associated development potentials 
stimulate and promote their application within risk management. Today, computer supported models as fault 
trees, event trees and Bayesian networks are commonly regarded and applied as standard tools for reliability 
and risk practitioners. There are though some important features that hardly can be captured by the 
conventional reliability analysis models and systems analysis methods. An improvement and alternative to 
the conventional approach is seen in using Discrete Event Simulation (DES) models that can better account 
for the dynamic dimensions of the systems. The paper will describe the authors’ experience in applying DES 
models to the analysis of large infrastructures for refueling stations and water supply. Two case studies are 
described which are concerned with the inherently safer supply and storage of hydrogen at refueling stations 
and an established drinking water supply system of a large metropolitan area, respectively. For both, the 
simulation aims at identifying points of potential improvement from the reliability point of view. This allows 
setting up a list of activities and safety measures to reduce risk and possible losses and mitigate the 
consequences of accidents. Based on the cases presented the advantages of DES modeling over the 
conventional models will be exhibited and discussed. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Computer simulation models of complex environments as a supportive tool for risk management have been 
around for many years. However, the rapid increase in computer power and the associated development of 
easy-to-use modelling tools promote the use of computer modelling and simulation as a standard tool for 
reliability and risk practitioner. Discrete Event Simulation (DES) models appear a competitive alternative to 
the conventional reliability analysis models and systems analysis methods. Software packages incorporating 
DES provide a number of probabilistic distributions, combined discrete and continuous simulation, and 
Monte-Carlo type simulations. In a broader sense DES is an analysis tool within systems theory as systems 
dynamics [1
• Dynamic demand: seasonal - daily changes  
], which is a methodology widely used for decision support to describe e.g. complex social, 
managerial, economic dynamic systems. Within risk management, DES models can rather easy account for 
dynamic stochastic dimensions of the systems and other important features, e.g. being applied to dynamic 
situations with:  
• Loss of partial performance and its degradation in time 
• Variations in commodity supply, e.g. gas supply  
• Condition dependent down times 
• Residual time of commodity supply after a system failure has occurred, e.g. gas 
delivery from line pack storage followed by a gas leakage 
• Gradual recovery after a failure, etc. 
 
Furthermore, our experience shows that DES models are a good communication tool between system 
analysts and domain experts. They simply mimic the behaviour of the systems, which is well understood by 
the domain experts and which positively contributes to the confidence to modelling results and model 
validation.  
 
Conventional systems analysis tools that can be used for the model development are fault and event trees, 
Bayesian networks, cause-consequence, and barrier diagrams. Such models have been used for decades and 
are very well described, for example, in [2, 3, 4]. While these diagrammatic causal networks have proven to 
be very effective tools for reliability and risks analyses, they cannot capture a number of the above 
mentioned and some other relevant features accurately. Therefore, the analyst often has to turn the problem 
in a way that it becomes solvable by existing reliability models and hereby evading answering 
straightforwardly questions posed by the client. This is sometimes called Type III Error [5
For instance, let us consider a pipeline rupture, and the consecutive failure of gas supply to a customer. 
Assessing the likelihood of the rupture event is readily done applying any of the conventional tools while 
these tools can hardly warrant an accurate assessment of the consecutive event. Formally, the link between 
the probabilities of the two events is the following: 
].  
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Where, )rupture PipelinefailureSupply (P  is the probability of the conditional event “Supply failure given 
Pipeline rupture”.  
 
To be able to assess the probability )rupture PipelinefailureSupply (P , one has to know the amount of gas in 
the line-pack storage at the instant of the pipeline rupture, pressure in the pipeline, hourly consumption at 
present and the following hours, etc. The hourly consumption, for example, depends in turn on the seasonal 
demand influenced largely by the ambient temperature, working cycles of the industrial clients and some 
other. On top of that, assessing the probability of supply interruption during a certain duration, which is often 
the measure of interest, makes the task hardly affordable for the conventional methods, as more features are 
to be taken into account like the duration of down times, gradual recovery after a failure, loss of partial 
performance, and some other. The conventional tools have a difficulty of accounting for the dynamic and 
continuous dimensions. 
 
Indeed, the mentioned conventional methods appear more difficult to apply when taking into account the 
dynamic dimensions of an analyzed system such as the unfoldment of an accident scenario in time, time 
pressure on operators under an accident, seasonal changes in the volumes of fuel supply, residual time of gas 
delivery from the line pack storage in a pipeline, down times, gradual recovery after a failure, loss of partial 
performance, and some other relevant temporal features. On the contrary, DES models can rather easily 
account for these dynamic dimensions and other important features.  
 
Traditionally, DES models are used within operation management to identify week points of existing service, 
process and production systems. The systems can be a manufacturing plant with machines, people, transport 
devices, conveyor belts and storage spaces; or a bank with different kind of customers, servers, loan desks, 
safety deposit boxes, etc; it can also be an emergency facility in a hospital, warehouses, and transportation 
links; or many others. Identifying probabilistic measures of events and processes and finding the ways of 
removing week points becomes the objective of DES modeling. There is abundance of literature describing 
DES models for different applications. 
 
The paper will describe briefly the author’s experience in applying DES models to the analysis of safety-
critical systems in two different domains. One case is about hydrogen refuelling stations for cars and buses 
while the second case is about the water supply system of a large metropolitan area. For both cases the 
simulation aims at identifying weak points of the systems from the reliability point of view, the availability 
of the systems and uninterruptable hydrogen and water supply, as well as frequencies of hazardous events 
and some other. This allows setting up a list of activities and safety measures to reduce risk and possible 
losses and mitigate the consequences of accidents. The DES environment used for both cases was the Arena 
software. Based on the cases presented the advantages of DES modelling over the conventional models will 
be exhibited and discussed. 
 
2.  THE SIMULATION APPROACH 
 
In discrete-event simulation, the operation of a system is represented as a chronological sequence of events. 
Each event occurs at an instant in time and marks a change of state in the system [6]. For example, if a road 
tanker carrying fuel is simulated, an event could be “road tanker has arrived to the station”, with the 
resulting state of “unloading the road tanker into a stationary tanker at the station” and eventually (unless 
one chooses to simulate the failure of the tanker, hoses, or some other equipment) “unloading completed” 
and “the tanker is leaving the station”. The road tanker can be identified as an entity, which is one of the 
central concepts in DES: It represents an object which is processed along a timeline in the system. An entity 
may also need attributes to be defined. An attribute is assigned to an entity describing various specific 
variables or parameters such as the amount of the transported fuel and the amount of fuel pumped out of the 
tanker. Furthermore, a list of failure events for randomly “arriving” tankers and interrupting the unloading 
process could be defined as an entity’s attributes. These would allow initializing different scenarios 
following the failure, etc. 
 
A discrete event computer simulation consists in imitating the behavior of a real system or/and undergoing 
processes during a defined period of time. If it concerns, for example, the activities taking place at a 
refueling station, the model imitates the arrival of fuel road tankers for unloading and cars/busses for filling 
up the tanks, queuing cars, cars leaving the station without being filled up because of the long queue, failures 
of different components possibly leading to a fuel release and accidents. Furthermore - and which is a great 
advantage of DES models compared to the static systems analysis approaches - daily and seasonal deviations 
in fuel demand as well as some other dynamically developing or degrading events can be modeled. Worth 
mentioning is the ability to model human performance of the people acting at the station. 
 
The occurring times, duration of services, waiting time in queues, instances of failures and other events and 
conditions are randomly sampled imitating the reality and reflecting the complexity of the system. The 
model runs over a long period of time and different statistics of interest are collected as the output of the 
modeling which in turn serve as an input for decision making (defining weak spots in the systems, 
prioritizing improvement and maintenance activities, etc.). Typical examples of collected statistics for 
reliability and risk analyses are: Expected failure frequency of the components/subsystems of interest, 
expected repair time, expected number of incidents and accidents, performance characteristics in terms of 
expected produced quantities, workloads, resource usage and many others.  
 
This modeling concept is as already mentioned above commonly used in operations management and 
therefore DES software packages provide functionality to simulate service and production facilities including 
failures of components such as downtimes expressed in MTTF and MTTR and their important cost 
parameters. The software typically provides the possibility to model other failure states that are important in 
risk assessment as e.g. mimicking an event tree and fault trees. An example for an uninterruptable power 
supply system modeled as a fault and event tree, respectively, is shown in Figure 1. For both trees, the failure 
probability for “Loss of power supply” is 1.2*10-5 assuming arbitrary input frequencies. In Figure 2 the same 
model is simulated with a simple DES model with a simulation period of 1000 h providing a probability of 
0.8*10-5, while the failure probabilities for the power generator (0.2%) and the switching device (0.097%) 
are closely predicted using the Monte Carlo type approach within the DES environment. Longer simulation 
times (larger samples of rare events) increases the precision of such models, e.g. setting the simulation time 
to 10000h results in a “Loss of power supply” probability of 1.1*10-5in close agreement to the analytical 
value. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Fault tree presentation (left) of a loss of power supply event taking into account a power backup 
system and the same using an Event tree presentation (right). The probabilities are shown for the two trees. 
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Figure 2. Simple DES model implementation of the power backup system. The “power-entity” is generated 
with a constant rate of 1 entity/s. Thus the numbers can be regarded as the number of occurred events or run 
time in seconds. The simulation covers a period of 1000 hours. 
 
3.  CASE 1: THE HYDROGEN SUPPLY SYSTEM  
 
The emerging hydrogen technology implies the development of a new refuelling infrastructure for vehicles. 
Several options to implement the refuelling stations are possible, depending on the specific production path 
to produce hydrogen: Hydrogen may be produced in a central facility and be transported by pipelines and/or 
road tankers to the respective refuelling stations as indicated in Figure 3, or it may be produced on site the 
refuelling stations e.g. using electrolysers [7, 8
 
]. Uninterrupted Hydrogen delivery has to be achieved in all 
cases to secure refuelling capacity, while an inherently safer approach would be keeping a minimum of on-
site hydrogen storage to reduce the risk potential and possibly the operating costs. 
 
Figure 3 Hydrogen infrastructure of refuelling stations with pipeline supply of hydrogen 
 
In the following, the focus is on the modelling and simulation of a single refuelling station that has facilities 
to refuel cars and busses and that is supplied with hydrogen from pipeline connections or road tanker supply. 
In the following, not the whole model will be described, but rather some aspects on the reliability type of 
modelling and how to use the structure of conventional approaches within DES environment. 
 
3.1.  Description of the generic refuelling station and its boundaries 
 
The generic station is developed in the NoE HySafe (see [9] about the NoE). A report is established 
describing the layout of a generic refuelling station that was the basis of a risk assessment benchmark 
exercise [10, 11]. The following elements are modelled [12
• Hydrogen supply by pipeline or road tanker;  
]:  
• Storage facilities (a main tank, a compressor, and buffer storage);  
• Dispensers to refuel car and busses, and  
• A cash desk.  
 
3.2. The scope of the modelling and input data 
 
The main focus of the work was to implement various failure modes found in risk assessments published as 
e.g. [13, 14
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] into the refuelling station model. A barrier diagram may be developed based on different kinds 
of hazard identification methods as Hazop, FMEA or Event trees.  
 
Figure 4. A barrier diagram describing possible failures and protective barriers for Hydrogen unloading. 
 
In the DES environment (Figure 5) such failures may be modelled by a module that uses an entity to create 
an event such as “truck has defects on arrival”, by that a global event failure variable is initialized and an 
alarm signal is raised that may be used to stop the flow process for the unloading procedure (Figure 6). In 
order to have statistics collected, the failure event is recorded and the time between failures (TBF) is 
estimated. In order to recover from the failure event, the cause of it has to be repaired that requires a certain 
time simulated in “recovering time from failure MTTR”. This process module simply delays the entity from 
proceeding and records therefore the lasting failure time. In the end, the variables and signals are reset and 
the entity is disposed. 
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Figure 5. Failures shown in the barrier diagram (Figure 4) are modelled in the DES Environment. This 
routine is linked to the model of the unloading process shown in Figure 6. 
 
In Figure 6 the unloading process is schematically shown and its DES model is exemplified. It is possible to 
simulate combined discrete and continuous events. 
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Figure 6. The unloading process and its simulation within the DES environment Arena 
 
 
3.3.  Simulation model and output 
 
The above model is able to predict the real world refuelling of cars and busses including the down times due 
to failures or fuel shortage caused by insufficient supply and storage capacity. The model has been verified 
using test data provided from large scale tests in Europe, as e.g. described in the CEP report of stations’ 
activities from 2002 to 2007 [15, 16]. Parameters such as refuelling frequencies for the cars and busses, 
arrival times at station, etc. have been sampled by triangular distributions. The collection of the data included 
a judgement of the data quality using the NUSAP approach [17
Table 1
].The results have though been subjected to a 
sensitivity analysis comparing the results based on a triangular distribution with other distributions as 
Poisson, constant time between arrivals and a scheduling pattern. The results for the stations availability and 
the total number of rejected cars are in close agreement for all the statistical functions used as shown in 
. 
 
The needed maximum capacity for the buffer storage is estimated to 990 kg hydrogen per day assuming 112 
vehicles per 24 hours - differentiated into 100 cars and 12 busses being refuelled with 4.5 kg and 45 kg 
hydrogen, respectively. The average needed capacity calculated from various simulation runs (six for the 
initial model) is found to be 934 ± 9 kg. Thus the estimation of maximum capacity is a conservative 
approach not being exceeded by the more detailed simulation. It is obvious that in larger scale refuelling 
stations with a larger variety of vehicles to be refuelled and taking seasonal changes into account the model 
will enable more precise predictions of the needed storage capacities and by that being a tool to minimize the 
amount of hazardous fuel stored on-site. 
 
Table 1. Sensitivity of input parameters [12] 
Distribution Availability % Rejected cars 
due to failure % 
Triangular 93.8 10.74 
Poisson 95.0 10.68 
Constant TBA 93.6 10.79 
Scheduling 93.7 10.48 
 
 
4.  CASE 2: THE WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM OF A LARGE METROPOLITAN AREA 
 
This study was carried out as part of the asset management carried out by the water department of 
Københavns Energi A/S (KE). KE supplies the metropolitan area of Copenhagen with drinking water. As 
resource optimization is of utmost importance for the stakeholders, the necessity of the supply system’s high 
performance is as important as to cope with the associated risks w.r.t. costs and/or health and safety. 
Currently, and also in the past, several analytical and non analytical approaches have been used in order to 
determine good practice for asset management, with different degrees of success. In the pursuit of an 
efficient asset management, KE was willing to apply some novel adequate tools, firstly, to be able to classify 
their assets against their criticality for the whole system and, secondly, to lay down a basis for a 
comprehensive tool for managing the operational risk of assets.  
 
4.1.  The water supply system in the metropolitan area of Copenhagen 
 
The key characteristics of the KE water supply system in the area around Copenhagen are the following [18
 
]: 
• Water is supplied to Copenhagen residents and to the residents of 16 other local authority areas. 
• A total of one million people are supplied with clean drinking water 
• KE manages: 7 waterworks, 54 well fields, 700 boreholes, 350 km of pressurized piping, a 1,100 km 
distribution network, and 
• Recovers 60 mio m3 of groundwater every year 
 
The water supply in Denmark consists basically of groundwater which is pumped from water reservoirs with 
built-in wells. All the wells in a determined zone constitute a well field. The water is then pumped to a water 
treatment works (WTW), where the water is treated before being supplied to the consumers. That is, the 
supplying system consists of 3 different phases: (1) raw water extraction, (2) water treatment, and (3) 
transportation and distribution. Each of them in turn consists of a number of different systems, components 
and equipment.  
 
  
Figure 7. The nodal points of the water supply system in the area around Copenhagen (Courtesy of 
København Energi A/S) 
 
The key component of the raw water extraction is the pump which can be either a vacuum pump or pressure 
pump. The water treatment phase is a system of three subsystems: Oxidation, first filtration, and second 
filtration. After all these processes, the clean water is stored in a clean water deposit ready to be pumped to 
the consumers. During the final phase the water is pumped through the transportation pipes to the ring pipe 
which supplies water to Copenhagen and the other municipalities (see Figure 7). Furthermore, there is a 
back-up system consisting of two deposits filled with water and air. These reservoirs are used as a buffer in 
order to supply water during daily and weekly demand peaks. They are built of ten independent sections, 
each of which can be isolated in case of pollution problems. The system is equipped with a numerous 
number of valves of different types as well as other measuring equipment. 
 
To fulfill the objective of the study, there was no need to model any single component of the system, but 
only those having major influence on risk and the reliability of the water supply. Considering the current 
study as a starting point in building up a comprehensive model of the whole system, we limited ourselves to 
modeling one part of it. 
 
4.2.  The scope of the modeling and input data 
 
The system which was modeled includes: The well fields which belong to Slangerup and Søndersø’s WTW, 
the WTWs themselves and the Tinghøj reservoir (Figure 7). In total 10 water fields were included in the 
model.  
 
The weekly water production of the modeled WTWs since 2007 until today was provided by KE in the form 
shown in Figure 8. Based on these data the probability distributions of the amount of produced water for 
each unit were constructed. 
 
 
Figure 8. Water production of the Slangerup WTW 
For each WTW, well field and the back-up reservoirs a list of critical assets was chosen consisting basically 
of vacuum, pressure and/or submersible pumps, and inlet and outlet valves. In total there were 37 pieces. 
Apart from these assets, the transportation pipelines connecting all the nodes of the analyzed part of the 
system were included in the model.  
 
Different maintenance and check schedules were taken into account for all the assets included in the model. 
We name few examples: The WTW itself is checked once every month and takes approximately 2 hours. 
The vacuum wells are checked twice a year. And a small and big service alternate in 6 months. In total it 
takes approximately 160 hours per year to serve the valves. The well pumps are checked once every month, 
which takes approximately 36 hours per year. The pipelines which connect Søndersø WTW with Tinghøj are 
checked twice every year and it takes approximately 90 hours per year. 
 
As the assets fail rarely, no specific failure data was possible to acquire. Instead, generic failure data were 
provided by the developer of Asset Performance Management software Optimiser+, MaxGrip. The failure 
probabilities and assessments of down times of all components of the critical assets were available for 
modeling [ 19
 
]. Generic reliability data for the transportation pipelines were also acquired. They were 
probability distributions of time to failure and down time for large and small damages due to high pressure 
and leakage because of corrosion. 
4.3. Simulation model and output 
 
The developed simulation model was simply a replica of the technological process in which some 
components or whole subsystems can fail possibly resulting in a water supply failure given the capacity of 
the back-up vessels is exceeded or they fail themselves. The model consists of the following units: Water 
generation → Water extraction from the well fields → Water treatment at WTWs → Water extraction from 
WTW → Water arrival to Tinghøj → Water supply to Copenhagen. Each component of the unit is assigned a 
probability distribution of time to failure and recovery time. All these units, components and their attributes 
are properly assembled in one integrated simulation model that also takes account of daily and seasonal 
demands and water production capacities. Then the model is run for a very long simulation time in order to 
be able to collect a sample of occurrences of rare adverse events. As the rarest failure event was a large 
damage of the transportation pipeline (1 event per 100 years on the average), the simulation time varied 
between 105 and 106 years and it took up to one hour of computer time to complete a simulation session.  
 
A large number of data was produced as an output of the simulation runs. Basically, they were average 
frequencies of unwanted events, times to failures (average, minimum, and maximum) for different 
subsystems and down times. The analysis of results’ sensitivity to the change of probability distributions of 
times to failure became also part of the study, which clear demonstrated the degree of influence of different 
distributions on the output. 
 
It is clear that generic failure data do not take account of any specific features of components’ usage. For 
example, the generic data cannot capture the degree of operational loads on components. Often one can 
expect that a higher exploitation time results in a shorter wear-out period. In this way, one can expect a 
higher failure frequency of the components with high loads. Resource usage was also part of the data 
outputted by the model in the form as shown in Figure 9. From this output we concluded, for example, that 
the inlet valves from Slangerup, Søndersø and Tinghøj water work (A, B, and C, correspondingly) and the 
outlet valve from Tinghøj (D) are subjected to higher loads or we can expect a shorter wear-out period or 
possibly higher failure frequency. This information is useful for possible revision of the maintenance 
schedule. 
 
 
Figure 9. Resource usage 
 
4.  DISCUSSION and CONCLUSION 
 
The paper described the application of DES modeling in connection with risk analysis for which dynamic 
characteristics of the modeled processes cannot be neglected. Hereunder the advantages compared to 
conventional models used in risk management are shown. It is seen that e.g. event trees and barrier diagrams 
are rather easily modeled and simulated by DES environments. This enables to make better predictions for 
dynamical situations with e.g. seasonal variations in input parameters such as the number of vehicles or 
amount of water consumed. Such models may provide more detailed answers to questions that depend on 
varying parameters and they retain geographical dependencies and time patterns. It is shown, e.g. in the 
hydrogen case, that all the following aspects may be implemented in the model, which makes such 
approaches valuable tools to plan sustainable implementation of new emerging technologies like  the future 
hydrogen infrastructures: 
 
– Secure, uninterrupted delivery to customers  
– Seasonal, weekly and daily changes in demand 
– Safety aspects (input to calculate individual and societal risk)  
– Operational costs 
– Minimum staff requirements 
– Best location of control room, repair shop, refuelling stations 
 
The model may also predict rare events that may occur during the lifetime of an (pipeline) installation, but 
the simulation run time may be millions of years as shown in the example, which of course is a drawback 
compared with situations where analytical calculations can be made. 
 
The quality of safety barriers, as shown here, may to a high degree depend on procedures and maintenance 
standards as well as on the educational level of the personal. Within the DES environment, it is possible to 
include human operations such as maintenance or any other task, which has been shown in [20, 21
 
]. By that, 
technical focused risk assessments can directly take human factors and performance into account. 
On a general note, computer simulation refers to methods for studying a wide variety of models of real-world 
systems by numerical evaluation using software designed to imitate the system’s operations or 
characteristics, often over time. The simulation model can be allowed to become quite complex and if 
needed to represent the system faithfully. The conventional methods require stronger simplifying 
assumptions about the system to enable an analysis, which might bring the validity of the model into 
question [5]. 
 
The DES models described in this paper have some other appealing features. By employing them, the focus 
is shifted from abstract disciplines like Boolean algebra, probability theory, binary decision diagrams, cut 
sets, etc., to mimicking real processes. As the models imitate the technological processes well understood by 
the field experts, these experts in turn become active collaborators in the model development, which raises 
confidence about the outcome and contributes positively to the model validation. 
 
The water supply case study shows that using DES for assessing companies concerning the risk of their 
assets is a feasible and promising option. The constantly raising and improving capabilities of both 
computers and simulation software predict a favorable future scenario for this activity. In the current times, 
where companies hardly ever have time or money to perform experiments or modifications with their assets, 
DES is a tool which is time and money saving and which can support the decision taking in a near future. 
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